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THE LAW OF DIVORCE JURISDICTION
A. J. GRONNA*
There are two great systems of law, the Roman Law and the
English Common Law. Roman Law, beginning as the law of the
City of Rome, became the law of the Roman Empire and thus of
the ancient world, and eventually, by absorption or reception from
the 12th to the 18th century, the law of modern Continental
Europe. In its original form, it consisted of the legislation of Roman
Emperors. Even today in a French Court, the statute rather than
judicial decision, is the source of a rule of law. In Continental
Furope a judicial decision has no authoritative force in any other
case, whether in the same or any other court. In England and in
this country, judicial decisions of appellate courts are precedents
for future cases, i.e., a point solemnly decided has the force and
effect of law, binding the judges in future cases. In England and
the United States, the unwritten or common law as declared by
judicial decisions of our appellate courts, is the source of a rule of
law, unless it has been changed by statute, and even then a judicial
decision construing such statute would control future decisions. To
this general rule there are exceptions such as is found in the law of
divorce. The early English courts had no jurisdiction or authority
to grant a divorce. There was no such thing as a "judicial divorce."
Only parliament or the church could grant a divorce. Divorce was
a special privilege which only the influential person could obtain.
This obvious injustice was remedied by the American colonists
through legislation. Legislation is a necessary adjunct of the com-
mon-law system. For example, it is for the legislature and not for
the courts to modify the common-law rules.
In North Dakota, and throughout the United States, matters per-
taining to divorce, separation, and alimony or support money are
regulated by statute. The courts look to the statutes as the source
ol their power in these matters. The origin of judicial divorce is
purely statutory. The courts in this state have no common-law
jorisdiction over the subject of divorce. Likewise, the courts of
England have no common-law jurisdiction over the subject of di-
vorce. In England too the origin of judicial divorce is purely statu-
tory. But it was not until 1857 that the courts of England had juris-
diction and power to hear and determine and grant divorces, sepa-
District Judge Fifth Judicial District of North Dakota. Text of speech delivered
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rations and annulments. Prior to 1857, divorces could not be ob-
tained except through an act of the English Parliament - this is
called a "legislative divorce." Legislative divorces are prohibited
in the United States. Thus, section 69 of the North Dakota Consti-
tution provides that "the Legislative Assembly shall not pass
special laws * * * for granting divorces."
In England, prior to 1857, the Church Courts of England, known
as ecclesiastical courts, could hear, determine and grant annul-
ments and separations. So, prior to 1857 the English Courts could
not sever or modify the vinculum matrimonii, or bond of matri-
mony. Unlike the United States, where there is separation of church
and state, England had two bodies of laws, Church law as well
as state law. The Church law was administered in ecclesiastical
courts. Since the purpose of exercising eccelesiastical jurisdic-
tion was to vindicate the divine law, the "vinculum" of marriage
was not severed for causes occurring subsequent to marriage; but
only for causes occurring prior to marriage, or because of canoni-
cal impediments existing prior to marriage, which prevented the
creation of a marital status or vinculum matrimonii. Among such
impediments to marriage were (1) previous marriage (2) con-
sanguinity, and (3) affinity. Such canonical impediments rendered
the marriage a nullity. In 1857, the Parliament of England enacted
the "Statutes of 1857, abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the eccle-
siastical courts" over matters of divorce, separation and annulment,
and transferred such jurisdiction to the temporal or secular courts.
This historical sketch is given to explain why the American courts
have no common-law jurisdiction over divorce and why the origin
of judicial divorce is purely statutory. Inasmuch as jurisdiction
over matters of divorce, separation and annulment of the bond of
matrimony were exclusively committed to the spiritual or ecclesi-
astical courts in England, or to Parliament, and inasmuch as such
jurisdiction had never been exercised by the common-law courts,
the same could not be exercised by the courts in the United States
until it had been vested in the State courts by the law-making
power of each State, namely, the state legislatures. Inasmuch as
we have never had any ecclesiastical courts in this Country which
could execute this branch of the law, it was held in abeyance until
our courts were properly clothed with jurisdiction over it by legis-
lative enactment, i. e., by State statutes. England, on the other
hand, has had its ecclesiastical courts for several centuries. And the
legal power to annul marriages has been recognized as existing in
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England from a very early period, but its administration, instead of
being committed to the common-law courts, was exercised by the
church courts.
Terminology used in England differs from that in the United
States, although terminology is not uniform in the United States.
In North Dakota the word "divorce" means a severing of the bond
of matrimony, or marriage status, for causes arising subsequent to
marriage . "Annulment" means a severing of the bond of matrimony
for causes existing prior to marriage. "Separation" means just that,
4 mere separation of the spouses from "bed and board" without a
severance of the bond of matrimony, or marriage status. In Eng-
land the term "divorce" applies to annulments as well as to what
we in North Dakota call a "divorce". In England, both an annul-
ment and a divorce are called "divorce a vinculo matrimonii", and,
as previously indicated, such Latin form of expression means "di-
vorce from the bond of matrimony." In England a "legal separa-
tion" is called a "divorce a mensa et thoro" or "judicial separation",
which means a legal separation from bed and board without a
severance of the vinculum or bond.
So, "judicial divorce" is an American "invention" and not an
English one. Divorces were granted in our American courts long
prior to 1857. However, there is no uniformity among the states
(of the United States) as to the various causes of actions for di-
vorce; and this makes it more apparent that the causes of action
for divorce are purely of statutory rather than of common-law
origin.
THE JURISDICTIONAL BASIS OF DIVORCE IS "DOMICIL"
England has the unitary system of government, as distinguished
from the federated system that exists in Canada and the United
States. This is because England is not subdivided into Provinces
or States. In England there is only one final authority, namely
Parliament. In the United States, each State is a sovereign power,
even though all of the states are federated or bound together into
a single, united nation. Thus, England with its unitary system can-
not have the problem arise as to the validity of a divorce which
probelm so often arises in the United States because neither party
was domiciled in the state of forum, that is, neither party was a
legal resideht of the state wherein the divorce was granted. It is for
this reason that occasionally Nevada divorces have been adjudged
null and void outside of Nevada.
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Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States
reads: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State -to . . .
the judicial proceedings of every other state. . . " The full faith
and credit clause requires state courts to recognize and respect as
valid the decrees and judgments of a sister state if, but only if, the
court had jurisdiction to render judgment. Why is it that Nevada
divorces have been adjudged null and void by the United States
Supreme Court as well as by Nevada's sister states? It is because a
divorce decree entered by a court in a state wherein neither of the
Farties (husband or wife) has a domicil is void for lack of jurisdic-
tion, and is not entitled to full faith and credit in any other state.
"Jurisdiction" means the power of a court to hear and determine
a cause of action - the power to decide incorrectly as well as cor-
rectly, subject only to the remedy of appeal. A person's domicil is
in that state in which he either has, or is deemed by law to have,
his permanent home and residence. The courts have devised and
adopted the "legal fiction" that the bond of matrimony, or marriage
status, is situated in such a state. The bond or status must be pres-
ent within the state of forum, otherwise the court is without juris-
diction or power to sever such bond and destroy such status. This
legal fiction as to the situs or location of the bond of matrimony, or
marriage status, is founded upon the legal principle that the state
wherein one or both of the spouses is domiciled or residing is most
concerned with such bond and status. In brief, the state of domicil
is most concerned with the family life of those whose home is with-
in its territory.
If a North Dakota resident went to Nevada and obtained a
divorce, and his wife prevailed in a North Dakota court in having
the Nevada divorce adjudged null and void, then the question
could arise in the United States Supreme Court as to which judg-
ment was valid, the Nevada judgment, or the subsequent one in
North Dakota. Inasmuch as the states are federated into a united
n:ation, in a conflict of laws between two co-equal sovereign states,
each of which has jurisdiction over the marriage status of its subject
citizens, there must be an arbiter. The United States Supreme
Court, as the ultimate expounder of the Federal Constitution, acts
as the final arbiter. In such a conflict between states, that court is
expounding the minimum requirements of the full faith and credit
clause of the Federal Constitution, and it exercises an independent
judgment as to what the law is, and is not bound by the local law
of either state. The United States Supreme Court has ruled, in
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effect, that judicial power (i. e. "jurisdiction") must be founded on
"domicil" if a divorce decree is to be given extraterritorial recogni-
tion. Thus the requirements of "domicil" is a federal restriction
upon the state courts, with respect to extraterritorial recognition of
their divorce decrees.
